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Online Clique Clustering∗
Marek Chrobak† Christoph Dürr‡ Aleksander Fabijan§ Bengt J. Nilsson§
Abstract
Clique clustering is the problem of partitioning the vertices of a graph into disjoint clusters,
where each cluster forms a clique in the graph, while optimizing some objective function. In online
clustering, the input graph is given one vertex at a time, and any vertices that have previously
been clustered together are not allowed to be separated. The goal is to maintain a clustering with
an objective value close to the optimal solution. For the variant where we want to maximize the
number of edges in the clusters, we propose an online strategy based on the doubling technique.
It has an asymptotic competitive ratio at most 15.646 and an absolute competitive ratio at most
22.641. We also show that no deterministic strategy can have an asymptotic competitive ratio
better than 6. For the variant where we want to minimize the number of edges between clusters,
we show that the deterministic competitive ratio of the problem is n−ω(1), where n is the number
of vertices in the graph.
1 Introduction
The correlation clustering problem and its different variants have been extensively studied over the
past decades; see e.g. [1, 5, 11]. The instance of correlation clustering consists of a graph whose
vertices represent some objects and edges represent their similarity. Several objective functions are
used in the literature, e.g., maximizing the number of edges within the clusters plus the number of
non-edges between clusters (maximizing agreements), or minimizing the number of non-edges inside
the clusters plus the number of edges outside them (minimizing disagreements). Bansal et al. [1] show
that both the minimization of disagreement edges and the maximization of agreement edges versions
are NP-hard. However, from the point of view of approximation the two versions differ. In the case
of maximizing agreements this problem actually admits a PTAS, whereas in the case of minimizing
disagreements it is APX-hard. Several efficient constant factor approximation algorithms are proposed
for minimizing disagreements [1, 5, 11] and maximizing agreements [5].
Some correlation clustering problems may impose additional restrictions on the structure or size
of the clusters. We study the variant, called clique clustering, where the clusters are required to form
disjoint cliques in the underlying graph G = (V,E). Here, we can maximize the number of edges
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inside the clusters or minimize the number of edges outside the clusters. These measures give rise to
the maximum and minimum clique clustering problems respectively. The computational complexity
and approximability of these problems have attracted attention recently [12, 15, 18], and they have
numerous applications within the areas of gene expression profiling and DNA clone classification [2,
14, 18, 19].
We focus on the online variant of clique clustering, where the input graph G is not known in
advance. (See [3] for more background on online problems.) The vertices of G arrive one at a time.
Let vt denote the vertex that arrives at time t, for t = 1, 2, . . .. When vt arrives, its edges to all
preceding vertices v1, . . . , vt−1 are revealed as well. In other words, after step t, the subgraph of G
induced by v1, v2, . . . , vt is known, but no other information about G is available. In fact, we assume
that even the number n of vertices is not known upfront, and it is revealed only when the process
terminates after step t = n.
Our objective is to construct a procedure that incrementally constructs and outputs a clustering
based on the information acquired so far. Specifically, when vt arrives at step t, the procedure first
creates a singleton clique {vt}. Then it is allowed to merge any number of cliques (possibly none) in
its current partitioning into larger cliques. No other modifications of the clustering are allowed. The
merge operation in this online setting is irreversible; once vertices are clustered together, they will
remain so, and hence, a bad decision may have significant impact on the final solution. This online
model was proposed by Charikar et al. [4].
We avoid using the word “algorithm” for our procedure, since it evokes connotations with com-
putational limits in terms of complexity. In fact, we place no limits on the computational power of
our procedure and, to emphasize this, we use the word strategy rather than algorithm. This approach
allows us to focus specifically on the limits posed by the lack of complete information about the input.
Similar settings have been studied in previous work on online computation, for example for online
medians [8, 9, 16], minimum-latency tours [6], and several other online optimization problems [10],
where strategies with unlimited computational power were studied.
Our results. We investigate the online clique clustering problem and provide upper and lower bounds
for the competitive ratios for its maximization and minimization versions, that we denote MaxCC
and MinCC, respectively.
Section 3 is devoted to the study of MaxCC. We first observe that the competitive ratio of the
natural greedy strategy is linear in n. We then give a constant competitive strategy for MaxCC
with asymptotic competitive ratio at most 15.646 and absolute competitive ratio at most 22.641. The
strategy is based on the doubling technique often used in online algorithms. We show that the doubling
approach cannot give a competitive ratio smaller than 10.927. We also give a general lower bound,
proving that there is no online strategy for MaxCC with competitive ratio smaller than 6. Both these
lower bounds apply also to asymptotic ratios.
In Section 4 we study online strategies for MinCC. We prove that no online strategy can have a
competitive ratio of n−ω(1). We then show that the competitive ratio of the greedy strategy is n− 2,
matching this lower bound.
2
2 Preliminaries
We begin with some notation and basic definitions of the MaxCC and MinCC clustering problems.
They are defined on an input graph G = (V,E), with vertex set V and edge set E. We wish to find a
partitioning of the vertices in V into clusters so that each cluster induces a clique in G. In addition,
we want to optimize some objective function associated with the clustering. In the MaxCC case, this
objective is to maximize the total number of edges inside the clusters, whereas in the MinCC case, we
want to minimize the number of edges outside the clusters.
We will use the online model, proposed by Charikar et al. [4], and Mathieu et al. [17] for the online
correlation clustering problem. Vertices (with their edges to previous vertices) arrive one at a time
and must be clustered as soon as they arrive. Throughout the paper we will implicitly assume that
any graph G has its vertices ordered v1, . . . , vn, according to the ordering in which they arrive on
input. The only two operations allowed are: singleton(vt), that creates a singleton cluster containing
the single vertex vt, and merge(C,C ′), which merges two existing clusters C,C ′ into one, under the
assumption that the resulting cluster induces a clique in G. This means that once two vertices are
clustered together, they cannot be later separated.
For MaxCC, we define the profit of a clustering C = {C1, . . . , Ck} on a given graph G = (V,E) to
be the total number of edges in these cliques, that is
∑k
i=1
(|Ci|
2
)
= 12
∑k
i=1 |Ci|(|Ci| − 1). Similarly,
for MinCC, we define the cost of C to be the total number of edges outside the cliques, that is
|E| −∑ki=1 (|Ci|2 ). For a graph G, we denote the optimal profit or cost for MaxCC and MinCC,
respectively, by profitOPT(G) and costOPT(G).
It is common to measure the performance of an online strategy by its competitive ratio. This ratio
is defined as the worst case ratio between the profit/cost of the online strategy and the profit/cost of
an offline optimal strategy, one that knows the complete input sequence in advance. More formally,
for an online strategy S, we define profitS(G) to be the profit of S when the input graph is G = (V,E)
and, similarly, let costS(G)
def
= |E| − profitS(G) be the cost of S on G.
We say that an online strategy S is R-competitive for MaxCC, if there is a constant β such that
for any input graph G we have
R · profitS(G) + β ≥ profitOPT(G). (1)
Similarly S is R-competitive for MinCC, if there is a constant β such that for any input graph G we
have
costS(G) ≤ R · costOPT(G) + β. (2)
The reason for defining the competitive ratio differently for maximization and minimization problems
is to have all ratios being at least 1. The smallest R for which a strategy S is R-competitive is called
the (asymptotic) competitive ratio of S. The smallest R for which S is R-competitive with β = 0 is
called the absolute competitive ratio of S. (If it so happens that these minimum values do not exist,
in both cases the competitive ratio is actually defined by the corresponding infimum.)
Note that an online strategy does not know when the last vertex arrives and, as a consequence, in
order to be R-competitive, it needs to ensure that the corresponding bound, (1) or (2), is valid after
each step.
3
3 Online Maximum Clique Clustering
In this section we study online MaxCC, the clique clustering problem where the objective is to
maximize the number of edges within the cliques. The main results here are upper and lower bounds
for the competitive ratio. For the upper bound, we give a strategy that uses a doubling technique to
achieve a competitive ratio of at most 15.646. For the lower bound, we show that no online strategy
has a competitive ratio smaller than 6. Additional results include a competitive analysis of the greedy
strategy and a lower bound for doubling based strategies.
3.1 The Greedy Strategy for Online MaxCC
Greedy, the greedy strategy for MaxCC, merges each input vertex with the largest current cluster
that maintains the clique property. This maximizes the increase in profit at this step. If no such
merging is possible the vertex remains in its singleton cluster. Greedy strategies are commonly used
as heuristics for a variety of online problems and can be shown to behave well for certain of them;
e.g. [17]. We show that the solution of Greedy can be far from optimal for MaxCC.
For n = 1, 2, 3, Greedy always finds an optimal clustering; see Figure 1, where all cases are shown.
Therefore throughout the rest of this section we will be assuming that n ≥ 4.
n=1
n=2
n=3
Figure 1: Greedy finds optimal clusterings (blue) for n = 1, 2, 3. Vertices are released in order from
left to right.
Theorem 1 Greedy has competitive ratio at least bn/2c for MaxCC.
Proof: We first give the proof for the absolute ratio, and then extend it to the asymptotic ratio.
Consider an adversary that provides input to the strategy to make it behave as badly as possible.
Our adversary creates an instance with n vertices, numbered from 1 to n. The odd vertices are
connected to form a clique, and similarly the even vertices are connected to form a clique. In addition
each vertex of the form 2i, for i = 1, . . . , b(n− 1)/2c, is connected to vertex 2i− 1; see Figure 2.
Greedy clusters the vertices as odd/even pairs, leaving the vertex 2k−1 as a singleton, if n = 2k−1
is odd and leaving both vertices 2k−1 and 2k as singletons, if n = 2k is even. This generates a clustering
of profit profitGDY(G) = k − 1. An optimal strategy clusters the odd vertices in one clique of size k
and the even vertices in another clique of size k− 1 or k, depending on whether n is odd or even. The
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Figure 2: Illustrating the proof of Theorem 1 for odd and even n.
profit for the optimal solution is profitOPT(G) = (k − 1)2, if n is odd and profitOPT(G) = k(k − 1), if n
is even. Hence, the ratio between the optimum and the greedy solution is k − 1 = (n− 1)/2 = bn/2c,
if n is odd, and k = n/2 = bn/2c, if n is even; hence the worst case absolute competitive ratio of the
greedy strategy is at least bn/2c.
To obtain the same lower bound on the asymptotic ratio, it suffices to notice that, if we follow the
above adversary strategy, then for any R < bn/2c and any constant β > 0, we can find sufficiently
large n for which inequality (1) will be false. 2
Next, we look at the upper bound for the greedy strategy.
Theorem 2 Greedy’s absolute competitive ratio for MaxCC is at most bn/2c.
Proof: As shown earlier, the theorem holds for n = 1, 2, 3, so we can assume that n ≥ 4. Fix an
optimal clustering on G that we denote OPT(G). Assume this clustering consists of p non-singleton
clusters of sizes c1, . . . , cp. The profit of OPT(G) is profitOPT(G) =
1
2
∑p
i=1 ci(ci − 1). Let k = maxi ci
be the size of the maximum cluster of OPT(G).
Case 1: k ≤ bn/2c. In this case, we can distribute the profit of each cluster of Greedy equally among
the participating vertices; that is, if a vertex belongs to a Greedy cluster of size c, it will be assigned
a profit of 12 (c− 1). We refer to this quantity as charged profit. We now note that at most one vertex
in each cluster of OPT(G) can be a singleton cluster in Greedy’s clustering, since otherwise Greedy
would cluster any two such vertices together. This gives us that each vertex in a non-singleton cluster
of OPT(G), except possibly for one, has charged profit at least 12 . So the total profit charged to the
vertices of an OPT(G) cluster of size ci is at least 12 (ci − 1). Therefore the profit ratio for this clique
of OPT(G), namely the ratio between its optimal profit and Greedy’s charged profit, is at most
1
2ci(ci − 1)
1
2 (ci − 1)
= ci.
From this bound and the case assumption, all cliques of OPT(G) have profit ratio at most k ≤ bn/2c,
so the competitive ratio is also at most bn/2c.
Case 2: k ≥ bn/2c + 1. In this case there is a unique cluster Q in OPT(G) of size k. The optimum
profit is maximized if the graph has one other clique of size n− k, so
profitOPT(G) ≤ 12k(k − 1) + 12 (n− k)(n− k − 1) = 12 (n2 + 2k2 − 2nk − n). (3)
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We now consider two sub-cases.
Case 2.1: Greedy’s profit is at least k. In this case, using (3) and k ≥ bn/2c + 1 ≥ 12 (n + 1), the
competitive ratio is at most
1
2 (n
2 + 2k2 − 2nk − n)
k
≤ 12 (n− 1) ≤ bn/2c.
where the first inequality follows from simple calculus. (The function (n2 + 2k2 − 2nk− n)− k(n− 1)
is non-positive for k = 12 (n + 1) and k = n and its second derivative with respect to k between these
two values is positive.)
Case 2.2: Greedy’s profit is at most k − 1. We show that in this case the profit of Greedy is in fact
equal to k − 1, and that Greedy’s clustering has a special form.
To prove this claim, consider those clusters of Greedy that intersect Q. For i ≥ 1 and j ≥ 0, let
dij be the number of these clusters that have i vertices in Q and j outside Q. Note that at most one
cluster of Greedy can be wholly contained in Q, as otherwise Greedy would merge such clusters if
it had more. Denote by α the size of this cluster of Greedy contained in Q (if it exists; if not, let
α = 0). Let also β = d11 and
γ =
∑
i,j≥1
i+j≥3
idij = k − α− β ≥ 0,
where k =
∑
i≥1,j≥0 idij counts the number of vertices in Q. The total profit of Greedy is at least
1
2
∑
i≥1,j≥0
(i+ j)(i+ j − 1)dij = 12α(α− 1) + β + 12
∑
i,j≥1
i+j≥3
(i+ j)(i+ j − 1)dij
≥ 12α(α− 1) + β + 32
∑
i,j≥1
i+j≥3
idij
= 12α(α− 1) + β + 32γ
= k + 12α(α− 3) + 12γ ≥ k − 1 + 12γ.
(The last inequality holds because, for integer values of α, the expression α(α − 3) is minimized for
α ∈ {1, 2}.) Combined with the case assumption that Greedy’s profit is at most k − 1, we conclude
that Greedy’s profit is indeed equal k − 1 and, in addition, we have that γ = 0 and α ∈ {1, 2}.
So, for α = 1, Greedy’s clustering consists of k− 1 disjoint edges, each with exactly one endpoint
in Q, plus a singleton vertex in Q. Thus n ≥ 2k − 1. As k ≥ bn/2c + 1, this is possible only when
n = 2k − 1. By (3), the optimal profit in this case is at most (k − 1)2, so the ratio is at most
k − 1 = bn/2c.
For α = 2, Greedy’s clustering consists of k − 1 edges, of which one is contained in Q and the
remaining ones have exactly one endpoint in Q. So n ≥ 2k − 2. If n is odd, this and the bound
k ≥ bn/2c+ 1 would force n = 2k − 1, in which case the argument from the paragraph above applies.
On the other hand, if n is even, then these bounds will force n = 2k−2. Then, by (3), the optimal profit
is k2−3k+3, so the competitive ratio is at most (k2−3k+3)/(k−1) = k−2+1/(k−1) ≤ k−1 = bn/2c,
for k ≥ 2. 2
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3.2 A Constant Competitive Strategy for MaxCC
In this section, we give our competitive online strategy OCC. Roughly, the strategy works in phases.
In each phase we consider the “batch” of nodes that have not yet been clustered with other nodes,
compute an optimal clustering for this batch, and add these new clusters to the strategy’s clustering.
The phases are defined so that the profit for consecutive phases increases exponentially.
The overall idea can be thought of as an application of the “doubling” strategy (see [10], for
example), but in our case a subtle modification is required. Unlike other doubling approaches, in our
strategy the phases are not completely independent: the clustering computed in each phase, in addition
to the new nodes, needs to include the singleton nodes from earlier phases as well. This is needed,
because in our objective function singleton clusters do not bring any profit.
We remark that one could alternatively consider using profit value k2/2 for a clique of size k, which
is a very close approximation to our function if k is large. This would lead to a simpler strategy and
much simpler analysis. However, this function is a bad approximation when the clustering involves
many small cliques. This is, in fact, the most challenging scenario in the analysis of our algorithm,
and instances with this property are also used in the lower bound proof.
3.2.1 The Strategy OCC
Formally, our method works as follows. Fix some constant parameter γ > 1. The strategy works in
phases, starting with phase j = 0. At any moment the clustering maintained by the strategy contains
a set U of singleton clusters. During phase j, each arriving vertex is added into U . As soon as there
is a clustering of U of profit at least γj , the strategy clusters U according to this clustering and adds
these new (non-singleton) clusters to its current clustering. (The vertices that form singleton clusters
remain in U .) Then phase j + 1 starts.
Note that phase 0 ends as soon as one edge is revealed, since then it is possible for OCC to create
a clustering with γ0 = 1 edge. The last phase may not be complete; as a result all nodes released in
this phase will be clustered as singletons. Observe also that the strategy never merges non-singleton
cliques produced in different phases.
3.2.2 Asymptotic Analysis of OCC
For the purpose of the analysis it is convenient to consider (without loss of generality) only infinite
ordered graphs G, whose vertices arrive one at a time in some order v1, v2, . . ., and we consider the
ratios between the optimum profit and OCC’s profit after each step. Furthermore, to make sure that all
phases are well-defined, we will assume that the optimum profit for the whole graph G is unbounded.
Any finite instance can be converted into an infinite instance with this property by appending to it an
infinite sequence of disjoint edges, without decreasing the worst-case profit ratio.
For a given instance (graph) G, define Oj(G) to be the total profit of the adversary at the end of
phase j in the OCC’s computation on G. Similarly, Sj(G) denotes the total profit of Strategy OCC
at the end of phase j (including the incremental clustering produced in phase j). During phase 0 the
graph is empty, and at the end of phase 0 it consists of only one edge, so S0(G) = O0(G) = 1. For any
phase j > 0, the profit of OCC is equal to Sj−1(G) throughout the phase, except right after the very
last step, when new non-singleton clusters are created. At the same time, the optimum profit can only
increase. Thus the maximum ratio in phase j is at most Oj(G)/Sj−1(G). We can then conclude that,
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to estimate the competitive ratio of our strategy OCC, it is sufficient to establish an asymptotic upper
bound on numbers Rj , for j = 1, 2, . . ., defined by
Rj = max
G
Oj(G)
Sj−1(G)
, (4)
where the maximum is taken over all infinite ordered graphs G. (While not immediately obvious, the
maximum is well-defined. There are infinitely many prefixes of G on which OCC will execute j phases,
due to the presence of singleton clusters. However, since these singletons induce an independent set
after j phases, only finitely many graphs G need to be considered in this maximum.)
Our objective now is to derive a recurrence relation for the sequence R1,R2, . . .. The value of R1 is
some constant whose exact value is not important here since we are interested in the asymptotic ratio.
(We will, however, estimate R1 later, when we bound the absolute competitive ratio in Section 3.2.3).
So now, assume that j ≥ 2 and that R1,R2, . . . ,Rj−1 are given. We want to bound Rj in terms of
R1,R2, . . . ,Rj−1. To this end, let G be the graph for which Rj is realized, that is Rj = Oj(G)/Sj−1(G).
With G fixed, to avoid clutter, we will omit it in our notation, writing Oj = Oj(G), Sj = Sj(G), etc.
In particular, Rj = Oj/Sj−1.
We now claim that, without loss of generality, we can assume that in the computation on G, the
incremental clusterings of Strategy OCC in each phase 1, 2, . . . , j − 1 do not contain any singleton
clusters. (The clustering in phase j, however, is allowed to contain singletons.) We will refer to this
property as the No-Singletons Assumption.
To prove this claim, we modify the ordering of G as follows: if there is a phase i < j such that the
incremental clustering of U in phase i clusters some vertex v from U as a singleton, then delay the
release of v to the beginning of phase i + 1. Postponing a release of a vertex that was clustered as a
singleton in some phase i < j to the beginning of phase i+1 does not affect the computation and profit
of OCC, because vertices from singleton clusters remain in U , and thus are available for clustering in
phase i + 1. In particular, the value of Sj−1 will not change. This modification also does not change
the value of Oj , because the graph induced by the first j phases is the same, only the ordering of the
vertices has been changed. We can thus repeat this process until the No-Singletons Assumption is
eventually satisfied. This proves the claim.
With the No-Singletons Assumption, the set U is empty at the beginning of each phase 0, 1, . . . , j.
We can thus divide the vertices released in phases 0, 1, . . . , j into disjoint batches, where batch Bi
contains the vertices released in phase i, for i = 0, 1, . . . , j. (At the end of phase i, right before the
clustering is updated, we will have Bi = U .) For each such i, denote by ∆i the maximum profit of a
clustering of Bi. Then the total profit after i phases is Si = ∆0 + · · · + ∆i, and, by the definition of
OCC, we have ∆i ≥ γi and Si ≥ (γi+1 − 1)/(γ − 1).
For i = 0, 1, . . . , j, let B¯i = B0 ∪ . . . ∪ Bi be the set of all vertices released in phases 0, . . . , i.
Consider the optimal clustering of B¯j . In this clustering, every cluster has some number a of nodes in
B¯j−1 and some number b of nodes in Bj . For any a, b ≥ 0, let ka,b be the number of clusters of this
form in the optimal clustering of B¯j . Then we have the following bounds, where the sums range over
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all integers a, b ≥ 0.
Oj =
∑(a+ b
2
)
ka,b (5)
Oj−1 ≥
∑(a
2
)
ka,b (6)
∆j ≥
∑(b
2
)
ka,b (7)
Sj−1 ≥ 12
∑
aka,b (8)
Equality (5) is the definition of Oj . Inequality (6) holds because the right hand side represents the
profit of the optimal clustering of B¯j restricted to B¯j−1, so it cannot exceed the optimal profit Oj−1 for
B¯j−1. Similarly, inequality (7) holds because the right hand side is the profit of the optimal clustering
of B¯j restricted to Bj , while ∆j is the optimal profit of Bj . The last bound (8) follows from the
fact that (as a consequence of the No-Singletons Assumption) our strategy does not have any singleton
clusters in B¯j−1. This means that in OCC’s clustering of B¯j−1 (which has
∑
aka,b vertices) each vertex
has an edge included in some cluster, so the number of these edges must be at least 12
∑
aka,b.
We can also bound ∆j , the strategy’s profit increase, from above. We have ∆0 = 1 and for each
phase j ≥ 1,
∆j ≤ γj + 12 (
√
8γj + 1 + 1) < γj +
√
2γj/2 + 2−
√
2. (9)
To show (9), suppose that phase j ends at step t (that is, right after vt is revealed). Consider the
optimal partitioning P of Bj , and let the cluster c containing vt in P have size p+ 1. If we remove vt
from this partitioning, we obtain a partitioning P ′ of the batch after step t− 1, whose profit must be
strictly smaller than γj . So the profit of P is smaller than γj+p. In partitioning P ′, the cluster c−{vt}
has size p. We thus obtain that
(
p
2
)
< γj , because, in the worst case, P consists only of the cluster c.
This gives us p < 12 (
√
8γj + 1 + 1). The second inequality in (9) follows by routine calculation.
From (9), by adding up all profits from phases 0, . . . , j, we obtain an upper bound on the total
profit of the strategy,
Sj <
γj+1 − 1
γ − 1 +
√
2 · γ
(j+1)/2 − γ1/2
γ1/2 − 1 + (2−
√
2)j + 1. (10)
Lemma 3.1 For any pair of non-negative integers a and b, the inequality(
a+ b
2
)
≤ (x+ 1)
(
a
2
)
+
x+ 1
x
(
b
2
)
+ a
holds for any 0 < x ≤ 1.
Proof: Define the function
F (a, b, x) = 2x(x+ 1)
(
a
2
)
+ 2(x+ 1)
(
b
2
)
+ 2ax− 2x
(
a+ b
2
)
= a2x2 − ax2 + 2ax+ b2 − b− 2abx
= (b− ax)2 + ax(2− x)− b,
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i.e., 2x times the difference between the right hand side and the left hand side of the inequality above.
It is sufficient to show that F (a, b, x) is non-negative for integers a, b ≥ 0 and 0 < x ≤ 1.
Consider first the cases when a ∈ {0, 1} or b ∈ {0, 1}. F (0, b, x) = b(b−1) ≥ 0, for any non-negative
integer b and any x. F (a, 0, x) = ax(ax − x + 2) ≥ ax(ax + 1) > 0, for any positive integer a and
0 < x ≤ 1. F (a, 1, x) = x2a(a− 1) ≥ 0, for any positive integer a and any x. F (1, 2, x) = 2− 2x ≥ 0,
for 0 < x ≤ 1, and F (1, b, x) = b2 − b+ 2x− 2bx ≥ b2 − 3b ≥ 0, for any integer b ≥ 3 and 0 < x ≤ 1.
Thus, it only remains to show that F (a, b, x) is non-negative when both a ≥ 2 and b ≥ 2. The
function F (a, b, x) is quadratic in x and hence has one local minimum at x0 = b−1a−1 , as can be easily
verified by differentiating F in x. Therefore, in the case when a ≤ b, F (a, b, x) ≥ F (a, b, 1) = (b −
a)2 − (b − a) ≥ 0, for 0 < x ≤ 1. In the case when a > b, we have that F (a, b, x) ≥ F (a, b, b−1a−1 ) =
(a−b)(b−1)
a−1 > 0, which completes the proof. 2
Suppose that j ≥ 2 and fix some parameter x, 0 < x < 1, whose value we will determine later.
Using Lemma 3.1, the bounds (5)–(8), and the definition of Rj−1, we obtain
RjSj−1 = Oj =
∑(a+ b
2
)
ka,b
≤ (x+ 1)
∑(a
2
)
ka,b +
x+ 1
x
∑(b
2
)
ka,b +
∑
aka,b
≤ (x+ 1)Oj−1 + x+ 1
x
∆j + 2Sj−1 (11)
≤ (x+ 1)Rj−1Sj−2 + x+ 1
x
∆j + 2Sj−1.
Thus Rj satisfies the recurrence
Rj ≤ x+ 1
xSj−1
[
xSj−2Rj−1 + ∆j
]
+ 2. (12)
From inequalities (9) and (10), we have
∆i = γ
i(1 + o(1)) and Si =
γi+1(1 + o(1))
γ − 1 .
for all i = 0, 1, . . . , j. Above, we use the notation o(1) to denote any function that tends to 0 as the
phase index i goes to infinity (with x and γ assumed to be some fixed constants, still to be determined).
Substituting into recurrence (12), we get
Rj ≤
(x+ 1
γ
+ o(1)
)
· Rj−1 + (x+ 1)(γ − 1)
x
+ 2 + o(1). (13)
Now define
R =
γ(γx+ x+ γ − 1)
x(γ − x− 1) . (14)
Lemma 3.2 Assume that x+ 1 < γ, then Rj = R+ o(1).
Proof: The proof is by routine calculus, so we only provide a sketch. For all j ≥ 1 let ρj = Rj − R.
Then, substituting this into (13) and simplifying, we obtain that the ρj ’s satisfy the recurrence
ρj ≤
(x+ 1
γ
+ o(1)
)
· ρj−1 + o(1). (15)
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Since x+ 1 < γ, this implies that ρj = o(1), and the lemma follows. 2
Lemma 3.2 gives us (essentially) a bound of R on the asymptotic competitive ratio of Strategy OCC,
for fixed values of parameters γ (of the strategy) and x (of the analysis). We can now choose γ and
x to make R as small as possible. R is minimized for parameters x = 12 (5 −
√
13) ≈ 0.697 and
γ = 12 (3 +
√
13) ≈ 3.303, yielding
R = 16 (47 + 13
√
13) ≈ 15.646.
Using Lemma 3.2, for each graph G and phase j, we have that Oj(G) ≤ (R+ o(1))Sj−1(G). Since, in
fact, R < 15.646, this implies that Oj(G) ≤ 15.646·Sj−1(G), as long as j is large enough. Thus Oj(G) ≤
15.646 · Sj−1(G) +O(1) for all phases j. As we discussed earlier, bounding Oj(G) in terms of Sj−1(G)
like this is sufficient to establish a bound on the (asymptotic) competitive ratio of Strategy OCC.
Summarizing, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 3 The asymptotic competitive ratio of Strategy OCC is at most 15.646.
3.2.3 Absolute Competitive Ratio
In fact, for γ = 12 (3 +
√
13), Strategy OCC has a low absolute competitive ratio as well. We show that
this ratio is at most 22.641. The argument uses the same value of parameter x = 12 (5 −
√
13), but
requires a more refined analysis.
When phase 0 ends, the competitive ratio is 1. For j ≥ 1, let O′j be the optimal profit right before
phase j ends. (Earlier we used Oj to estimate this value, but Oj also includes the profit for the last
step of phase j.) It remains to show that for phases j ≥ 1 we have R′j ≤ 22.641, where R′j = O′j/Sj−1.
By exhaustively analyzing the behavior of Strategy OCC in phase 1, taking into account that
γ ≈ 3.303 > 3, we can establish that R′1 = 10. We will then bound the remaining ratios using a refined
version of recurrence (12).
We start by estimating R′1. Let t be the last step of phase 1. Since γ ≈ 3.303, after step t − 1
the profit of the vertices released in phase 1 is at most 3. We can assume that phase 0 has only two
vertices v1, v2 connected by an edge. LetH be the graph induced by v1, . . . , vt−1 andH ′ be its subgraph
induced by v3, . . . , vt−1. We thus want to bound the optimal profit of H, under the assumption that
the optimal profit of H ′ is at most 3.
Denote by Ki the clique with i vertices. The optimal clustering of H ′ cannot include a K4, and
either
1. H ′ has no K3, and it has at most three K2 cliques, or
2. H ′ has a K3, with each edge of H ′ having at least one endpoint in this K3.
In Case 1, H cannot contain a K5. If a clustering of H includes a K4 then this K4 contains v1, v2, and
two vertices from phase 1. So in addition to this K4 it can at best include two K2’s, for a total profit
of at most 8. In Case 2, if a clustering of H includes a K5, then it cannot include any cluster except
this K5, so its profit is 10. If a clustering of H includes a K4, then this K4 must contain at least one
of v1 and v2, and it may include at most one other clique of type K2. This will give a total profit of
at most 7. Summarizing, in each case the profit of H is at most 10 giving us R′1 ≤ 10, as claimed.
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Table 1: Some initial bounds for Sj and the absolute competitive ratio.
Phase (j) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
min Sj 1 5 16 53 172 566 1 864 6 152 20 311
max Sj 1 7 23 68 202 623 1 972 6 352 20 679
Bound (R′j) 1.000 10.000 13.185 18.636 21.881 22.641 21.516 19.925 18.509
For phases j ≥ 2, we can tabulate upper bounds for R′j by explicitly computing the ratios R′j =
O′j/Sj−1 using the following modification of recurrence (12),
R′j ≤
x+ 1
xSj−1
[
xSj−2R′j−1 + ∆j
]
+ 2, (16)
where we use the more exact bounds
dγje ≤ ∆j ≤ bγj + 12 (
√
8γj + 1 + 1)c,
obtained by rounding the bounds ∆j ≥ γj and (9), which we can do because ∆j is integral. From the
definition of Sj
def
= 1 +
∑j
i=1 ∆i we compute the first few estimates as shown in Table 1.
To bound the sequence {R′j}j≥9 we rewrite recurrence (16) as
R′j ≤
(x+ 1)Sj−2
Sj−1
· R′j−1 +
(x+ 1)∆j
xSj−1
+ 2 = αjR
′
j−1 + βj ,
and bound αj and βj using (9) and (10). With routine calculations, we can establish the bounds
αj <
3
5 and βj < 8, for j ≥ 8.
Thus, R′j ≤ Rˆj , where Rˆj is
Rˆj =
3
5 Rˆj−1 + 8 ≤ 20− a
(
3
5
)j
,
for j ≥ 8 and some positive constant a. The sequence {Rˆj}j≥9, is thus bounded above by a monoton-
ically growing function of j having limit 20 and hence Rˆj ≤ 20 for every j ≥ 9.
Combining this with the bounds estimated in Table 1, we see that the largest bound on R′j is 22.641
given for j = 5. We can thus conclude that the absolute competitive ratio of OCC is at most 22.641.
We can improve on the absolute competitive ratio by choosing different values for γ and x that
allow the asymptotic competitive ratio to increase slightly. The optimal values can be found empirically
(using mathematical software) to be γ = 4.02323428 and x = 0.823889, giving asymptotic competitive
ratio 15.902 and absolute competitive ratio 20.017.
3.3 A Lower Bound for Strategy OCC
In this section we will show that, for any choice of γ, the worst-case ratio of Strategy OCC is at
least 10.927.
Denote by Bj the j-th batch, that is the vertices released in phase j. We will use notation Sj for
the profit of OCC and Oj for the optimal profit on the sub-instance consisting of the first j batches.
To avoid clutter we will omit lower order terms in our calculations. In particular, we focus on j being
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Figure 3: The lower bound example for Strategy OCC. The figure shows two batches Bi and Bj , for
i < j. Batch edges, drawn with solid lines, are collected by Strategy OCC. Dashed lines show cross
edges that are in the adversary’s clustering. Shaded regions illustrate the cliques in the adversary’s
clustering.
large enough, treating γj as integer, and all estimates for Sj and Oj given below are meant to hold
within a factor of 1 ± o(1). (The asymptotic notation is with respect to the phase index j tending
to ∞.)
We start with a simpler construction that shows a lower bound of 9; then we will explain how to
improve it to 10.927. In the instance we construct, all batches will be disjoint, with the jth batch
Bj having 2γj vertices connected by γj disjoint edges (that is, a perfect matching). We will refer to
these edges as batch edges. The edges between any two batches Bi and Bj , for i < j, form a complete
bipartite graph. These edges will be called cross edges; see Figure 3.
At the end of each phase j, the strategy will collect all γj edges inside Bj . Therefore, by summing
up the geometric sequence, right before the end of phase j (before the strategy adds the new edges
from Bj to its clustering), the strategy’s profit is
Sj−1 =
j−1∑
i=0
γi ≤ γ
j
γ − 1 .
After the first j phases, the adversary’s clustering consists of cliques Cp, p = 0, 1, . . . , γj − 1, where
Cp contains the p-th edge (that is, its both endpoints) from each batch Bi for i = p, p + 1, . . . , j; see
Figure 3. We claim that the adversary gain after j phases satisfies
Oj ≥ Oj−1 + γj + 4
j−1∑
i=0
γi = Oj−1 +
(γ + 3)γj
γ − 1 . (17)
(Recall that all equalities and inequalities in this section are assumed to hold only within a factor of
1± o(1).) We now justify this bound. The second term γj is simply the number of batch edges in Bj .
To see where each term 4γi comes from, consider the p-th batch edge from Bi, for i < j. When we
add Bj after phase j, the adversary can add the 4 cross edges connecting this edge’s endpoints to the
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endpoints of the pth batch edge in Bj to Cp. Overall, this will add 4γi cross edges between Bi and Bj
to the existing adversary’s cliques.
From recurrence (17), by simple summation, we get
Oj ≥ (γ + 3)γ
j+1
(γ − 1)2 .
Dividing it by OCC’s profit of at most γj/(γ − 1), we obtain that the ratio is at least γ(γ+3)γ−1 , which,
by routine calculus, is at least 9.
We now outline an argument showing how to improve this lower bound to 10.927. The new
construction is almost identical to the previous one, except that we change the very last batch Bj . As
before, each batch Bi, for i < j, has γi disjoint edges. Batch Bj will also have γj edges, but they will
be grouped into q = 13γ
j disjoint triangles. (So Bj has γj vertices.) For p = 0, 1, . . . , q− 1, we add the
p-th triangle to clique Cp. (If q > γj−1, the last q − γj−1 triangles will form new cliques.)
This modification will preserve the number of edges in Bj and thus it will not affect the strategy’s
profit. But now, for each i = 0, 1, . . . , j − 1 and each p = 0, 1, . . . ,min(q, γi) − 1, we can connect the
two vertices in Bi ∩ Cp to three vertices in Bj , instead of two. This creates two new cross edges that
will be called extra edges. It should be intuitively clear that the number of these extra edges is Ω(γj),
which means that this new construction gives a ratio strictly larger than 9.
Specifically, to estimate the ratio, we will distinguish three cases, depending on the value of γ.
Suppose first that γ ≥ 3. Then q ≥ γj−1, so the number of extra edges is 2∑j−1i=0 γi = 2γj/(γ − 1),
because each vertex in B0 ∪ B1 ∪ · · · ∪ Bj−1 is now connected to three vertices in Bj , not two. Thus
the new optimal profit is
O′j = Oj +
2γj
γ − 1 =
(γ2 + 5γ − 2)γj
(γ − 1)2 .
Dividing by OCC’s profit, the ratio is at least γ
2+5γ−2
γ−1 , which is at least 11 for γ ≥ 3.
The second case is when
√
3 ≤ γ ≤ 3. Then γj−2 ≤ q ≤ γj−1. In this case all vertices in
B0 ∪ B1 ∪ · · · ∪ Bj−2 and 23γj vertices in Bj−1 get an extra edge, so the number of extra edges is
2γj−1/(γ − 1) + 23γj . Therefore the new adversary profit is
O′j = Oj + 2
γj−1
γ − 1 +
2
3γ
j =
(5γ3 + 5γ2 + 8γ − 6)γj−1
3(γ − 1)2 .
We thus have that the ratio is at least 5γ
3+5γ2+8γ−6
3γ(γ−1) . Minimizing this quantity, we obtain that the
ratio is at least 10.927.
The last case is when 1 < γ ≤ √3. In this case, even using the earlier strategy (without any extra
edges), we have that the ratio Oj/Sj−1 =
γ(γ+3)
γ−1 is at least 3+6
√
3 ≈ 11.2 (it is minimized for γ = √3).
3.4 A Lower Bound of 6 for MaxCC
We now prove that any deterministic online strategy S for the clique clustering problem has competitive
ratio at least 6. We present the proof for the absolute competitive ratio and explain later how to extend
it to the asymptotic ratio. The lower bound is established by showing, for any constant R < 6, an
adversary strategy for constructing an input graph G on which profitOPT(G) ≥ R · profitS(G), that is
the optimal profit is at least R times the profit of S.
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Figure 4: On the left, an example of a skeleton tree T . The core subtree of T has depth 2 and two
tentacles, one of length 2 and one of length 1. On the right, the corresponding graph G.
Skeleton trees. Fix some non-negative integer D. (Later we will make the value of D depend on
R.) It is convenient to describe the graph constructed by the adversary in terms of its underlying
skeleton tree T , which is a rooted binary tree. The root of T will be denoted by r. For a node v ∈ T ,
define the depth of v to be the number of edges on the simple path from v to r. The adversary will
only use skeleton trees of the following special form: each non-leaf node at depths 0, 1, . . . , D − 1 has
two children, and each non-leaf node at levels at least D has one child. Such a tree T can be thought
of as consisting of its core subtree, which is the subtree of T induced by the nodes of depth up to D,
with paths attached to its leaves at level D. The nodes of T at depth D are the leaves of the core
subtree. If v is a leaf of the core subtree of T then the path extending from v down to a leaf of T is
called a tentacle – see Figure 4. (Thus v belongs both to the core subtree and to the tentacle attached
to v.) The length of a tentacle is the number of its edges. The nodes in the tentacles are all considered
to be left children of their parents.
Skeleton-tree graphs. The graph represented by a skeleton tree T will be denoted by G. We
differentiate between the nodes of T and the vertices of G. The relation between T and G is illustrated
in Figure 4. The graph G is obtained from the tree T as follows:
• For each node u ∈ T we create two vertices uL and uR in G, with an edge between them. This
edge (uL, uR) is called the cross edge corresponding to u.
• Suppose that u, v ∈ T . If u is in the left subtree of v then (uL, vL) and (uR, vL) are edges of G.
If u is in the right subtree of v then (uL, vR) and (uR, vR) are edges of G. These edges are called
upward edges.
• If u ∈ T is a node in a tentacle of T and is not a leaf of T , then G has a vertex uD with edge
(uD, uR). This edge is called a whisker.
The adversary strategy. The adversary constructs T and G gradually, in response to strategy S’s
choices. Initially, T is a single node r, and thus G is a single edge (rL, rR). At this time, profitS(T ) = 0
and profitOPT(T ) = 1, so S is forced to collect this edge (that is, it creates a 2-clique {rL, rR}), since
otherwise the adversary can immediately stop with unbounded absolute competitive ratio.
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Figure 5: Adversary moves. Upward edges from new vertices are not shown, to avoid clutter. Dashed
lines represent cross edges that are not collected by S, while thick lines represent those that are already
collected by S.
In general, the invariant of the construction is that, at each step, the only non-singleton cliques
that S can add to its clustering are cross edges that correspond to the current leaves of T . Suppose
that, at some step, S collects a cross edge (uL, uR), corresponding to node u of T . (S may collect more
cross edges in one step; if so, the adversary applies its strategy to each such edge independently.) If u
is at depth less than D, the adversary extends T by adding two children of u. If u is at depth at least
D, the adversary only adds the left child of u, thus extending the tentacle ending at u. In terms of G,
the first move appends two triangles to uL and uR, with all corresponding upward edges. The second
move appends a triangle to uL and a whisker to uR (see Figure 5). In the case when S decides not to
collect any cross edges at some step, the adversary stops the process.
Thus the adversary will be building the core binary skeleton tree down to depth D, and from then
on, if the game still continues, it will extend the tentacles. Our objective is to prove that, in each step,
right after the adversary extends the graph but before S updates its clustering, we have
profitOPT(T ) ≥ (6− D) · profitS(T ), (18)
where D → 0 when D →∞. This is enough to prove the lower bound of 6− D on the absolute ratio.
The reason is this: If S does not collect any edges at some step, the game stops, the ratio is 6 − D,
and we are done. Otherwise, the adversary will stop the game after 2D+1 +M steps, where M is some
large integer. Then the profit of S is bounded by 2D+1 + M (the number of steps) plus the number
of remaining cross edges, and there are at most 2D of those, so S’s profit is at most 2D+2 + M . At
that time, T will have at least M nodes in tentacles and at most 2D tentacles, so there is at least one
tentacle of length M/2D, and this tentacle contributes Ω((M/2D)2) edges to the optimum. Thus for
M large enough, the ratio between the optimal profit and the profit of S will be larger than 6 (or any
constant, in fact).
Once we establish (18), the lower bound of 6 will follow, because for any fixed R < 6 we can take
D large enough to get a lower of 6− D ≥ R.
Computing the adversary’s profit. We now explain how to estimate the adversary’s profit for G.
To this end, we provide a specific recipe for computing a clique clustering of G. We do not claim that
this particular clustering is actually optimal, but it is a lower bound on the optimum profit, and thus
it is sufficient for our purpose.
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For any node v ∈ T that is not a leaf, denote by PL(v) the longest path from v to a leaf of T that
goes through the left child of v. If v is a non-leaf in the core tree, and thus has a right child, then
PR(v) is the longest path from v to a leaf of T that goes through this right child. In both cases, ties
are broken arbitrarily but consistently, for example in favor of the leftmost leaves. If v is in a tentacle
(so it does not have the right child), then we let PR(v) = {v}.
Let PL(v) = (v = v1, v2, ..., vm), where vm is a leaf of T . Since v is not a leaf, the definition of T
implies that m ≥ 2. We now define the clique CL(v) in G that corresponds to PL(v). Intuitively, for
each vi we add to CL(v) one of the corresponding vertices, vLi or vRi , depending on whether vi+1 is the
left or to the right child of vi. The following formal definition describes the construction of CL(v) in a
top-down fashion:
• vL1 ∈ CL(v).
• Suppose that 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 and that vσi ∈ CL(v), for σ ∈ {L,R}. Then
– if i = m− 1, add vLm and vRm to CL(v);
– otherwise, if vi+2 is the left child of vi+1, add vLi+1 to CL(v), and if vi+2 is the right child of
vi+1, add vRi+1 to CL(v).
We define CR(v) analogously to CL(v), but with two differences. One, we use PR(v) instead of PL(v).
Two, if v is in a tentacle then we let CR(v) = {vR, vD}. In other words, the whiskers form 2-cliques.
Observe that except cliques CR(v) corresponding to the whiskers (that is, when v is in a tentacle),
all cliques Cσ(v) have cardinality at least 3.
r
x
y
p
q
rL rR
xR
yL
pL
qL qR
Figure 6: On the left, an example of a path PL(r) = (r, x, y, p, q) in T . In this example, D = 3. The
corresponding clique CL(r) is shown on the right (darker shape). The figure on the right also shows
the adversary clique partitioning of G. To avoid clutter, upward edges are not shown.
We now define a clique partitioning C∗ of G, as follows: First we include cliques CL(r) and CR(r) in
C∗. We then proceed recursively: choose any node v such that exactly one of vL, vR is already covered
by some clique of C∗. If vL is covered but vR is not, then include CR(v) in C∗. Similarly, if vR is covered
but vL is not, then include CL(v) in C∗.
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Analysis. Denote by Tv the subtree of T rooted at v. By Gv we denote the subgraph of G induced
by the vertices that correspond to the nodes in Tv. Each clique in C∗ that intersects Gv induces a clique
in Gv, and the partitioning C∗ induces a partitioning C∗v of Gv into cliques. We will use notation Ov
for the profit of partitioning C∗v . Note that C∗v can be obtained with the same top-down process as C∗,
but starting from v as the root instead of r.
We denote strategy S’s profit (the number of cross edges) within Gv by Sv . In particular, we have
profitS(G) = Sr and profitOPT(G) ≥ Or. Thus, to show (18), it is sufficient to prove that
Or ≥ (6− D) · Sr, (19)
where D → 0 when D →∞.
We will in fact prove an analogue of inequality (19) for all subtrees Tv. To this end, we distinguish
between two types of subtrees Tv. If Tv ends at depth D of T or less (in other words, if Tv is inside
the core of T ), we call Tv shallow. If Tv ends at depth D+ 1 or more, we call it deep. So deep subtrees
are those that contain some tentacles of T .
Lemma 3.3 If Tv is shallow, then
Ov ≥ 6 · Sv.
Proof: This can be shown by induction on the depth of Tv. If this depth is 0, that is Tv = {v},
then Ov = 1 and Sv = 0, so the ratio is actually infinite. To jump-start the induction we also need
to analyze the case when the depth of Tv is 1. This means that S collected only edge (vL, vR) from
Tv. When this happened, the adversary generated vertices corresponding to the two children of v in
T and his clustering will consist of two triangles. So now Ov = 6 and Sv = 1, and the lemma holds.
Inductively, suppose that the depth of Tv is at least two, let y, z be the left and right children
of v in T , and assume that the lemma holds for Ty and Tz. Naturally, we have Sv = Sy + Sz + 1.
Regarding the adversary profit, since the depth of Tv is at least two, cluster CL(v) contains exactly
one of yL, yR; say it contains yL. Thus CL(v) is obtained from CL(y) by adding vL. By the definition
of clustering C∗, the depth of Ty is at least 1, which means that adding vL will add at least three
new edges. By a similar argument, we will also add at least three edges from vR. This implies that
Ov ≥ Oy + Oz + 6 ≥ 6 · Sy + 6 · Sz + 6 ≥ 6 · Sv, completing the inductive step. 2
From Lemma (3.3) we obtain that, in particular, if T itself is shallow then Or ≥ 6 · Sr, which is
even stronger than inequality (19) that we are in the process of justifying. Thus, for the rest of the
proof, we can restrict our attention to skeleton trees T that are deep.
So next we consider deep subtrees of T . The core depth of a deep subtree Tv is defined as the
depth of the part of Tv within the core subtree of T . (In other words, the core depth of Tv is equal
to D minus the depth of v in T .) If h and s are, respectively, the core depth of Tv and its maximum
tentacle length, then 0 ≤ h ≤ D and s ≥ 1. The sum h+ s is then simply the depth of T .
Lemma 3.4 Let Tv be a deep subtree of core depth h ≥ 0 and maximum tentacle length s ≥ 1, then
Ov + 2(h+ s) ≥ 6 · Sv.
Before proving the lemma, let us argue first that this lemma is sufficient to establish our lower
bound. Indeed, since we are now considering the case when T is a deep subtree itself, the lemma
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Figure 7: Illustration of the proof of Lemma 3.4, the base case. Subtree Tv on the left, the corresponding
subgraph Gv on the right.
implies that Or + 2(D + s) ≥ 6 · Sr, where s is the maximum tentacle length of T . But Or is at least
quadratic in D + s. So for large D the ratio Or/Sr approaches 6.
Proof: To prove Lemma 3.4, we use induction on h, the core depth of Tv. Consider first the base
case, for h = 0 (when Tv is just a tentacle). In his clustering C∗v , the adversary has one clique of s+ 2
vertices, namely all xL vertices in the tentacle (there are s + 1 of these), plus one zR vertex for the
leaf z. He also has s whiskers, so his profit for Tv is
(
s+2
2
)
+ s = 12 (s
2 + 5s + 2). S collects only s
edges, namely all cross edges in Tv except the last. (See Figure 7.) Solving the quadratic inequality
and using the integrality of s, we get Ov + 2s ≥ 6s = 6 · Sv. Note that this inequality is in fact tight
for s = 1 and 2.
In the inductive step, consider a deep subtree Tv. Let y and z be the left and right children of v.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that Ty is a deep tree with core depth h − 1 and the same
maximum tentacle length s as Tv, while Tz is either shallow (that is, it has no tentacles), or it is a
deep tree with maximum tentacle length at most s.
By the inductive assumption, we have Oy + 2(h − 1 + s) ≥ 6 · Sy. Regarding z, if Tz is shallow
then from Lemma 3.3 we get Oz ≥ 6 · Sz, and if Tz is deep (necessarily of core depth h − 1) then
Oz + 2(h− 1 + s′) ≥ 6 · Sz, where s′ is Tz’s maximum tentacle length, such that 1 ≤ s′ ≤ s.
Consider first the case when Tz is shallow. Note that
Sv = Sy + Sz + 1 and
Ov ≥ Oy + Oz + h+ s+ 4
The first equation is trivial, because the profit of S in Gv consists of all cross edges in Gy and Gz,
plus one more cross edge (vL, vR). The second inequality holds because the adversary clustering C∗v is
obtained by adding vL to Gy’s cluster with (h− 1) + s+ 2 = h+ s+ 1 vertices, and vR can be added
19
!z!y
u!u
!z!y
!u uRuL
Figure 8: Illustration of the proof of Lemma 3.4, the inductive step. Subtrees Tv, Ty, Tz on the left,
the corresponding subgraphs on the right.
to Gz’s cluster that with at least 3 vertices. We get
Ov + 2(h+ s) ≥ [Oy + Oz + h+ s+ 4] + 2(h+ s)
≥ [Oy + 2(h− 1 + s)] + Oz + 6
≥ 6 · Sy + 6 · Sz + 6
= 6 · Sv.
The second case is when Tz is a deep tree (of the same core depth h − 1 as Ty) with maximum
tentacle length s′, where 1 ≤ s′ ≤ s. As before, we have Sv = Sy +Sz + 1. The optimum profit satisfies
(by a similar argument as before, applied to both Ty and Tz)
Ov ≥ Oy + Oz + 2h+ s+ s′ + 2.
We obtain (using s ≥ s′)
Ov + 2(h+ s) ≥ [Oy + Oz + 2h+ s+ s′ + 2] + 2(h+ s)
≥ [Oy + 2(h− 1 + s)] + [Oz + 2(h− 1 + s′)] + 6
≥ 6 · Sy + 6 · Sz + 6
= 6 · Sv.
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.4. 2
We still need to explain how to extend our proof so that it also applies to the asymptotic competitive
ratio. This is quite simple: Choose some large constant K. The adversary will create K instances of
the above game, playing each one independently. Our construction above uses the fact that at each
step the strategy is forced to collect one of the pending cross edges, otherwise its competitive ratio
exceeds ratio R (where R is arbitrarily close to 6). Now, for K sufficiently large, the strategy is forced
20
2 j−1v
v2
v1
2 jv 2β+2
v
2β+1v
Figure 9: Illustrating the lower bound proof of Theorem 4. The figure shows the optimal clustering
for the graph.
to collect cross edges in all except for some finite number of copies of the game, where this number
depends on the additive constant in the competitiveness bound.
Note: Our construction is very tight, in the following sense. Suppose that S maintains T as
balanced as possible. Then the ratio is exactly 6 when the depth of T is 1 or 2. Furthermore, suppose
that D is very large and the strategy constructs T to have depth D or more, that is, it starts growing
tentacles (but still maintaining T balanced.) Then the ratio is 6 − o(1) for tentacle lengths s = 1
and s = 2. The intuition is that when the adversary plays optimally, he will only allow the online
strategy to collect isolated edges (cliques of size 2). For this reason, we conjecture that 6 is the optimal
competitive ratio.
4 Online MinCC Clustering
In this section, we study the clique clustering problem with a different measure of optimality that we
call MinCC. For MinCC, we define the cost of a clustering C to be the total number of non-cluster
edges. Specifically, if the cliques in C are C1, C2, ..., Ck then the cost of C is |E| −
∑k
i=1
(|Ci|
2
)
. The
objective is to construct a clustering that minimizes this cost.
4.1 A Lower Bound for Online MinCC Clustering
In this section we present a lower bound for deterministic MinCC clustering.
Theorem 4 (a) There is no online strategy for MinCC clustering with competitive ratio n − ω(1),
where n is the number of vertices.
(b) There is no online strategy for MinCC clustering with absolute competitive ratio smaller
than n− 2.
Proof: (a) Consider a strategy S with competitive ratio Rn = n − ω(1). Thus, according to the
definition (2) of the competitive ratio, there is a constant β that satisfies costS(G) ≤ Rn·costOPT(G)+β,
where n = |G|. We can assume that β is a positive integer.
The adversary first produces a graph of 2β+2 vertices connected by β+1 disjoint edges (v2i−1, v2i),
for i = 1, 2, . . . , β+ 1. At this point, S must have added at least one pair {v2j−1, v2j} to its clustering,
21
BA
vu
u’
A
vu
u’ v’
Figure 10: Illustration of the proof of Theorem 5.
because otherwise, since costOPT(G) = 0, inequality (2) would be violated. The adversary then chooses
some large n and adds n − 2β − 2 new vertices v2β+3, . . . , vn that together with v2j form a clique of
size n− 2β − 1; see Figure 9. All edges from v2j to these new vertices are non-cluster edges for S and
the optimum solution has only one non-cluster edge (v2j−1, v2j). Thus
costS(G)− β ≥ (n− 2β − 2)− β = n− 3β − 2 = (n− 3β − 2) · costOPT(G) > Rn · costOPT(G),
if n is large enough, giving us a contradiction.
(b) The proof of this part is a straightforward modification of the proof for (a): the adversary
starts by releasing just one edge (v1, v2), and the online strategy is forced to cluster v1 and v2 together,
because now β = 0. Then the adversary forms a clique of size n− 1 including v2. The details are left
to the reader. 2
4.2 The Greedy Strategy for Online MinCC Clustering
We continue the study of online MinCC clustering, and we prove that Greedy, the greedy strategy
presented in Section 3.1, yields a competitive ratio matching the lower bound from the previous section.
Theorem 5 The absolute competitive ratio of Greedy is n− 2.
Proof: The key observation for this proof is that, for any triplet of vertices u, v, and v′, if the
graph contains the two edges (u, v) and (u, v′) but v and v′ are not connected by an edge, then in any
clustering at least one of the edges (u, v) or (u, v′) is a non-cluster edge.
Claim A: Let (u, v) be a non-cluster edge of Greedy. Then OPT (the optimal clustering) has at least
one non-cluster edge adjacent to u or v (which might also be (u, v) itself).
Without loss of generality suppose vertex v arrives after vertex u. Let A be the cluster of Greedy
containing vertex u at the moment when vertex v arrives. We have that v /∈ A. If A contains some
vertex u′ not connected to v, then the earlier key observation shows that one of the edges (u′, u), (u, v)
is a non-cluster edge for OPT; see Figure 10.
Now assume that v is connected to all vertices of A. Greedy had an option of adding v to A and it
didn’t, so it placed v in some clique B (of size at least 2) that is not merge-able with A, that is, there
are vertices u′ ∈ A and v′ ∈ B which are not connected by an edge. Now the earlier key observation
shows that one of the edges (u′, v), (v, v′) is a non-cluster edge of OPT. This completes the proof of
Claim A.
To estimate the number of non-cluster edges of Greedy, we use a charging scheme. Let (u, v) be
a non-cluster edge of Greedy. We charge it to non-cluster edges of OPT as follows.
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Self charge: If (u, v) is a non-cluster edge of OPT, we charge 1 to (u, v) itself.
Proximate charge: If (u, v) is a cluster edge in OPT, we split the charge of 1 from (u, v) evenly among
all non-cluster edges of OPT incident to u or v.
From Claim A, the charging scheme is well-defined, that is, all non-cluster edges of Greedy have been
charged fully to non-cluster edges of OPT. It remains to estimate the total charge that any non-cluster
edge of OPT may have received. Since the absolute competitive ratio is the ratio between the number
of non-cluster edges of Greedy and the number of non-cluster edges of OPT, the maximum charge to
any non-cluster edge of OPT is an upper bound for the absolute competitive ratio.
Consider a non-cluster edge (x, y) of OPT. Edge (x, y) can receive charges only from itself (self
charge) and other edges incident to x or y (proximate charges). Let P be the set of vertices adjacent
to both x and y, and let Q be the set of vertices that are adjacent to only one of them, but excluding
x and y:
P = N(x) ∩N(y) and Q = N(x) ∪N(y)− P − {x, y}.
(N(z) denotes the neighborhood of a vertex z, the set of vertices adjacent to z.) We have |P |+ |Q| ≤
n− 2.
Edges connecting x or y to Q will be called Q-edges. Trivially, the total charge from Q-edges to
(x, y) is at most |Q|.
Edges connecting x or y to P will be called P -edges. Consider some z ∈ P . Since x and y are in
different clusters of OPT, at least one of P -edges (x, z) or (y, z) must also be a non-cluster edge for
OPT. By symmetry, assume that (x, z) is a non-cluster edge for OPT. If (x, z) is a non-cluster edge
of Greedy then (x, z) will absorb its self charge. So (x, z) will not contribute to the charge of (x, y).
If (y, z) is a non-cluster edge of Greedy then either it will be self charged (if it’s also a non-cluster
edge of OPT) or its proximate charge will be split between at least two edges, namely (x, y) and (x, z).
Thus the charge from (y, z) to (x, y) will be at most 12 . Therefore the total charge from P -edges to
(x, y) is at most 12 |P |. We now have some cases.
Case 1: (x, y) is a cluster edge of Greedy. Then (x, y) does not generate a self charge, so the total
charge received by (x, y) is at most 12 |P |+ |Q| ≤ |P |+ |Q| ≤ n− 2.
Case 2: (x, y) is a non-cluster edge of Greedy. Then (x, y) contributes a self charge to itself.
Case 2.1: |P | ≥ 2. Then 12 |P | ≤ |P |−1, so the total charge received by (x, y) is at most 12 |P |+|Q|+1 ≤
(|P | − 1) + |Q| = |P |+ |Q| ≤ n− 2.
Case 2.2: At least one Q-edge is a cluster edge of Greedy. Then the total proximate charge from
Q-edges is at most |Q|−1, so the total charge received by (x, y) is at most 12 |P |+ (|Q|−1) + 1 ≤
|P |+ |Q| ≤ n− 2.
Case 2.3: |P | ∈ {0, 1} and allQ-edges are non-cluster edges ofGreedy. We claim that this case cannot
actually occur. Indeed, if |P | = 0 then Greedy would cluster x and y together. Similarly, if
P = {z}, then Greedy would cluster x, y and z together. In both cases, we get a contradiction
with the assumption of Case 2.
Summarizing, we have shown that each non-cluster edge of OPT receives a total charge of at most
n− 2, and the theorem follows. 2
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The proof of Theorem 5 applies in fact to a more general class of strategies, giving an upper bound
of n − 2 on the absolute competitive ratio of all “non-procrastinating” strategies, which never leave
merge-able clusters in their clusterings (that is clusters C, C ′ such that C ∪ C ′ forms a clique).
References
[1] Nikhil Bansal, Avrim Blum, and Shuchi Chawla. Correlation clustering. Machine Learning, 56(1-
3):89–113, 2004.
[2] Amir Ben-Dor, Ron Shamir, and Zohar Yakhini. Clustering gene expression patterns. Journal of
Computational Biology, 6(3/4):281–297, 1999.
[3] Allan Borodin and Ran El-Yaniv. Online computation and competitive analysis. Cambridge
University Press, 1998.
[4] Moses Charikar, Chandra Chekuri, Tomás Feder, and Rajeev Motwani. Incremental clustering
and dynamic information retrieval. SIAM J. Comput., 33(6):1417–1440, 2004.
[5] Moses Charikar, Venkatesan Guruswami, and Anthony Wirth. Clustering with qualitative infor-
mation. In Foundations of Computer Science, 2003. Proceedings. 44th Annual IEEE Symposium
on, pages 524–533. IEEE, 2003.
[6] Kamalika Chaudhuri, Brighten Godfrey, Satish Rao, and Kunal Talwar. Paths, trees, and mini-
mum latency tours. In 44th Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2003), 11-14
October 2003, Cambridge, MA, USA, Proceedings, pages 36–45, 2003.
[7] Marek Chrobak, Christoph Dürr, and Bengt J. Nilsson. Competitive strategies for online clique
clustering. In Proc. 9th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC’15), pages
101–113, 2015.
[8] Marek Chrobak and Mathilde Hurand. Better bounds for incremental medians. Theor. Comput.
Sci., 412(7):594–601, 2011.
[9] Marek Chrobak, Claire Kenyon, John Noga, and Neal E. Young. Incremental medians via online
bidding. Algorithmica, 50(4):455–478, 2008.
[10] Marek Chrobak and Claire Kenyon-Mathieu. SIGACT news online algorithms column 10: com-
petitiveness via doubling. SIGACT News, 37(4):115–126, 2006.
[11] Erik D. Demaine and Nicole Immorlica. Correlation clustering with partial information. In
Proc. 6th International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization
Problems (APPROX’03), pages 1–13, 2003.
[12] Anders Dessmark, Jesper Jansson, Andrzej Lingas, Eva-Marta Lundell, and Mia Persson. On the
approximability of maximum and minimum edge clique partition problems. In Proceedings of the
12th Computing: The Australasian Theory Symposium (CATS’06), pages 101–105, 2006.
24
[13] Aleksander Fabijan, Bengt J. Nilsson, and Mia Persson. Competitive online clique clustering.
In Proc. 8th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC’13), pages 221–233,
2013.
[14] Andres Figueroa, James Borneman, and Tao Jiang. Clustering binary fingerprint vectors with
missing values for DNA array data analysis. Journal of Computational Biology, 11(5):887–901,
2004.
[15] Andres Figueroa, Avraham Goldstein, Tao Jiang, Maciej Kurowski, Andrzej Lingas, and Mia
Persson. Approximate clustering of incomplete fingerprints. J. Discrete Algorithms, 6(1):103–108,
2008.
[16] Guolong Lin, Chandrashekhar Nagarajan, Rajmohan Rajaraman, and David P. Williamson. A
general approach for incremental approximation and hierarchical clustering. SIAM J. Comput.,
39(8):3633–3669, 2010.
[17] Claire Mathieu, Ocan Sankur, and Warren Schudy. Online correlation clustering. In 27th In-
ternational Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS’10), pages 573–584,
2010.
[18] Ron Shamir, Roded Sharan, and Dekel Tsur. Cluster graph modification problems. Discrete
Applied Mathematics, 144(1-2):173–182, 2004.
[19] Lea Valinsky, Gianluca Della Vedova, Ra J. Scupham, Sam Alvey, Andres Figueroa, Bei Yin,
R. Jack Hartin, Marek Chrobak, David E. Crowley, Tao Jiang, and James Borneman. Analysis of
bacterial community composition by oligonucleotide fingerprinting of rRNA genes. Applied and
Environmental Microbiology, 68:2002, 2002.
25
